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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22017 
STATE OF NEW YORK (SUNY OSWEGO), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. 
VOLFORTE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(SUNY Oswego) (State) and cross-exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the State violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
determined that Odilon Martinez had not passed his probationary period as a 
Grade 6 Laborer and would, thus, return to his Grade 5 Cleaner position, and by 
refusing to accept Martinez' withdrawal of his resignation tendered after his 
receipt of his probationary evaluation. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision on numerous grounds, both 
factual and legal, but primarily argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the rating 
in Martinez' final evaluation was motivated by anti-union animus and by ordering 
the State to accept Martinez' withdrawal of his resignation and restore him to his 
probationary status as a Grade 6 Laborer. CSEA supports the ALd's findings of 
fact and law and the remedy, but argues that the ALJ should have found that 
Martinez was constructively discharged from his employment. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, but modify the remedy. 
FACTS 
The facts are thoroughly set forth in the ALJ's decision1. The facts are set 
) 
forth here only as relevant to our discussion of the exceptions and the 
cross-exceptions. 
Martinez had been an employee of SUNY-Oswego (SUNY) for over ten 
years, the bulk of that time as a Grade 5 Cleaner. As a result of the settlement of 
a grievance filed on his behalf by CSEA, Martinez was placed in the position of a 
Grade 6 Laborer, effective June 24, 1999, with a one-year probationary period. 
The conditions of Martinez' appointment were that, during his probationary 
period, he acquire a CDL license, complete an English as a Second Language 
(ESL) course and improve, and maintain as improved, his time and attendance 
record. 
1
 35 PERB 1J4591 (2002). 
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Martinez worked directly with Thomas Abbott, a Grade 7 highway 
equipment operator in SUNY's Grounds Department, who sometimes supervised 
him. Abbott testified that Martinez' work performance was very good, that he 
never refused overtime, that he requested additional work when his assigned 
task was completed and that he always arrived early. Abbott further testified that 
it is not normally a responsibility for a Grade 6 Laborer to initiate work projects. 
Alan Buske was Martinez' immediate supervisor at all times relevant to the 
charge. He worked with Mary DePentu, the head grounds supervisor at SUNY, in 
compiling the three quarterly, and one final, evaluations of Martinez' probationary 
appointment. Martinez' evaluations all rated him as a fair employee; a "fair" 
rating is not sufficient to pass a probationary period. His first, second and final 
evaluations refer negatively to his sick leave usage and accruals; his third 
evaluation notes that he had not used any sick leave, but that his accruals were 
still not at acceptable levels. All the evaluations make reference to Martinez' lack 
of self-confidence; however, the third evaluation defines this lack of self-
confidence as "involving CSEA in matters that [Martinez] should be discussing 
directly with his supervisors."2 Martinez' final evaluation cites the insufficient 
increase in his sick leave accruals and the fact that Martinez has done little to 
improve his overall performance, except obtain his CDL license, during his 
probation. 
2
 CSEA Exhibit 7 
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It is undisputed on this record that Buske objected to Martinez seeking the 
assistance of CSEA in any disputes he had with Buske.3 It is further undisputed 
that both Buske and DePentu believed that Martinez should speak to his 
supervisor first, before going to CSEA, and that it would be "easier" if Martinez 
did not go to CSEA but came to Buske or DePentu first. Neither Buske nor 
DePentu ever forbade Martinez to contact CSEA. -----
When Martinez received his final evaluation from Buske and DePentu, on 
June 8, 2000, he was informed that he had failed probation and would be 
returned to his Grade 5 Cleaner position. Martinez then went to SUNY's 
personnel office and spoke to Marta Santiago, SUNY's human resources 
manager and affirmative action officer. He informed her he was resigning 
because of his poor evaluation. She had a letter of resignation typed for him, he 
signed it, thanked her for all her help and left the office. Martinez' resignation was 
confirmed in a June 9, 2000 letter from Santiago to Martinez, which also 
discussed the mechanics of resigning a position at SUNY. 
On June 9, 2000, Martinez called the office of Joseph Micelli, CSEA's unit 
president, because he had reconsidered his resignation. As Micelli was not 
available, Martinez went to Micelli's office the following Monday, June 12, 2000, 
and asked Micelli to help him get his job back. The next day, June 13, 2000, with 
the assistance of Micelli and a CSEA labor relations specialist, Christopher 
Jamison, Martinez drafted a memorandum in which he withdrew his June 8, 2000 
resignation, explaining that he acted under duress from receiving his 
3
 Buske was not called as a witness by the State. 
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probationary evaluation. Martinez immediately hand-delivered the memorandum 
to Santiago. By letter dated the same day, Santiago denied Martinez' request to 
withdraw his resignation because it had already been accepted. 
While there is evidence that other SUNY employees have resigned, there 
is no record evidence that any have attempted to withdraw their resignations. 
The reasons given by SUNY for refusing to accept Martinez- withdrawal of-his 
resignation is that there was no compelling reason to do so, as testified to by 
both Santiago and her supervisor, George Stooks, SUNY's director of physical 
plant. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ determined that Buske's and DePentu's perception that CSEA 
was contacting them regarding work issues on Martinez' behalf was a key 
element in Martinez failing his probation and that the probationary evaluations 
were motivated by Buske's anti-union animus. She, thus, determined that the 
State had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by the evaluation and the 
termination of Martinez" probation. Because the ALJ determined that Martinez' 
resignation was a direct result of his failure of probation, the ALJ ordered the 
State to rescind the final probation evaluation, reinstate Martinez to a 
probationary Grade 6 Laborer within the Grounds Department at SUNY and 
reevaluate him without consideration of his union activity. 
As correctly noted by the ALJ, we held in City of Buffalo4: 
Section 209-a.1(a) of the Act broadly and generally 
prohibits employer actions which interfere with 
4
 30 PERB 1J3021, at 3048 (1997). 
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employees' statutory rights. Employees have the 
protected statutory right to have union representation 
with respect to any issue affecting their employment 
relationship, whether or not that issue embraces a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. That request for 
and receipt of union representation constitutes 
participation in a union, a right specifically protected 
by §202 of the Act. 
Here, Martinez had the statutory right to seek the assistance of CSEA in his 
dealings with his supervisors. To the extent that his supervisors took action 
against him because of the assistance he sought and received from CSEA, 
§§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act was violated. 
The record makes clear that both Buske and DePentu preferred that 
Martinez deal directly with them and not seek CSEA's assistance. It is also clear 
from Martinez' third evaluation that Buske and DePentu evaluated him negatively 
as lacking self-confidence because of his contacts with CSEA. As we stated in 
City of Buffalo, supra, 
The statutory right of employees to seek out and 
receive their union's help regarding any issue, 
mandatorily negotiable or otherwise, obviously 
becomes entirely meaningless if they risk losing their 
jobs or other employment conditions simply because 
their union has chosen to give them help in a way 
their employer considers to be unacceptable or 
frustrating. 
We find, therefore, that the State violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) when it 
considered in Martinez' evaluation his exercise of protected rights and evaluated 
him negatively because of it. While there is record evidence of Buske's animus 
toward Martinez for the exercise of protected rights and evidence that Buske's 
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animus colored his input into Martinez' evaluations, our finding of a violation is 
not dependent on a finding of animus. 
In Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District5 (hereafter, 
Greenburgh), we moved away from the earlier holding in State of New York6 that 
some conduct is so inherently destructive of statutory rights as to be "irrebuttably 
presumed" to have been engaged in for the purpose of depriving employees of 
those rights. We found in Greenburgh that the better rule would be to hold that if 
the facts make out a permissive presumption that an employer's conduct was 
engaged in for the purpose of depriving employees of protected rights, that would 
shift the burden of proof to the responding party to destroy the presumption by 
sufficient proof to the contrary. Here, we find that the consideration of Martinez' 
protected activities in his probationary evaluation was destructive of his statutory 
rights and that the articulated rationale of DePentu that she and Buske preferred 
that Martinez deal with his supervisors before consulting with CSEA is insufficient 
to destroy the presumption that their conduct was engaged in for the purpose of 
depriving Martinez of his statutory rights. 
We find that the evaluation that rated Martinez as a "fair" employee and 
resulted, at least in part, in his failure of his probationary period for Grade 6 
Laborer, violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
Ordinarily, we would order, as did the ALJ, that Martinez' final evaluation 
be rescinded, that Martinez be restored to his probationary position as a Grade 6 
5
 33 PERB 1J3018, at 3048 (2000). 
6
 10 PERB H3108(1977). 
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Laborer in SUNY"s Grounds Department and that his probationary status be 
reevaluated without consideration of his exercise of protected rights. However, 
Martinez has resigned and is no longer an employee of SUNY. The ALJ found 
that the resignation was a direct result of the failure of probation and ordered the 
State to offer reinstatement to Martinez. 
GSEA-argues that Martinez was-constructively discharged" and thathis 
reinstatement should be based upon such a finding. The State argues that 
Martinez should not be reinstated because there is no causal link between 
Martinez' failure of his probationary period and his resignation. 
Generally, a constructive discharge occurs when an employer 
"deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the 
employee is forced into an involuntary resignation."7 Constructive discharge 
cases often focus on whether the employee reasonably believed he or she was 
being terminated or whether he or she voluntarily quit.8 
Here, Martinez was not forced to resign. He was not threatened or 
harassed into tendering his resignation. That Martinez was frustrated at the 
thought of being demoted does not render his working conditions intolerable. 
Martinez was certainly familiar with his rights under the Act, having sought 
CSEA's assistance on numerous occasions in the past when faced with 
7
 Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F2d 322, 325 (2nd Cir. 1983) (quoting Young 
v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 91 LRRM 1302 (1976); Kripke v. Benedictine 
Hospital, 169 Misc2d 98 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1996). 
Norman Brand, Discipline and Discharge in Arbitration, 71 (1998). 
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disciplinary issues and contractual concerns. Unfortunately, this time he took 
matters into his own hands and tendered his resignation. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that Santiago harbored any anti-union 
animus towards Martinez that prompted her refusal to accept the withdrawal of 
his resignation; the ALJ specifically declined to make such a finding based upon 
the record before her. Further, there is no evidence that the State deviated from 
any practice at SUNY of accepting the withdrawal of a resignation from an 
employee after it had been tendered and accepted. 
We do not find on this record that Martinez was "constructively 
discharged". We further find no causal link between the final evaluation and 
Martinez' loss of employment that would compel ordering the State to accept 
Martinez' withdrawal of his resignation and to reinstate him to the Grade 6 
Laborer position.9 
We, therefore, find that the State violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act 
when it considered Martinez' exercise of protected rights in his final probationary 
evaluation. We affirm the ALJ's decision on the merits of the charge. However, 
given that Martinez resigned, our remedial options are limited to addressing the 
State's conduct in Martinez' final evaluation. We, therefore, reverse the ALJ's 
remedy insofar as it orders that Martinez be offered reinstatement as a Grade 6 
Laborer in SUNY's Grounds Department. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State of New York (SUNY 
Oswego) forthwith: 
J 9See Holland Patent Cent Sch. Dist... 32 PERB P041 (1999). 
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1. Rescind the final probationary evaluation of Odilon Martinez 
dated June 8, 2000; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining or 
discriminating against Odilon Martinez for the exercise of 
protected rights in its final evaluation of him as a Grade 6 
Laborer; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations ordinarily used 
to post notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cueyas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (SUNY Oswego) in 
the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the State will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the final probationary evaluation of Odilon Martinez dated 
June 8, 2000; 
2. Not interfere with, restrain or discriminate against Odilon Martinez for 




State of New York (SUNY Oswego) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COLD SPRING HARBOR TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL #2710, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22619 
COLD SPRING HARBOR CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
DANIEL A. BAHR, for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, LLP (WARREN RICHMOND of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Cold Spring Harbor Central 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that 
the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally assigned to nonunit employees work exclusively performed by 
employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Cold Spring Harbor Teachers' 
Association, Local #2710, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association).1 The ALJ found that 
the District had assigned the unsupervised teaching of students to two teaching 
assistants, who are not in the unit represented by Association. 
1
 The ALJ dismissed the alleged §209-a.1(a) allegation. No exceptions have been filed 
to that part of the ALJ's decision. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision arguing that the ALJ failed to rule 
properly on its affirmative defense of timeliness, its defense that Association's 
Education Law §3813 notice of claim was not timely and on the facts and the law. The 
Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our-review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In September 2000, the District began providing Academic Intervention Services 
(AIS), pursuant to regulations promulgated by the New York State Commissioner of 
Education (Commissioner), to students in its two elementary schools who were in 
danger of performing poorly on standardized tests. The services were provided by two 
teaching assistants, Sandra Curcuru and Christine Iwanczewski.2 Curcuru and 
Iwanczewski are both employed as half-time teachers and half-time AIS teaching 
assistants. The record reflects that Iwanczewski's appointment was recommended by 
her Building Principal, Gary LaFemina, to the Superintendent of Schools, Rick Volp, in a 
memorandum dated October 25, 2000, which states, in relevant part: "Christine will be 
providing academic intervention service (AIS) under the direction of Phyllis Miller." Miller 
is a teacher in the Association's bargaining unit. Barbara Lacey, principal of the 
elementary school to which Curcuru is assigned, testified that Curcuru was assigned to 
meet with the regular classroom teachers to identify students in need of assistance and 
to coordinate her services with the lesson plan being taught by the teachers. 
; 
2
 Teaching assistants are not in the teachers' unit represented by NYSUT. 
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Curcuru and Iwanczewski testified, however, that they functioned autonomously, 
without direct supervision from classroom teachers. Curcuru testified that she had not 
been told to report to any teacher upon her appointment. Iwanczewski and Miller both 
testified that Iwanczewski was not supervised by Miller; indeed, Miller testified that she 
had never been directly instructed to supervise Iwanczewski.3 
-••4n-Deeember--2-000-,-Tom--Hallr'the-junior---and-senior-high-sehool-prineipal,--met-
with Bird Norton, president of the Assocation unit, and advised him that AIS services 
would begin in the high school in February 2001, that teachers would be assigned to 
provide the service, and that the teachers so assigned would receive additional pay. 
Hall pointed out to Norton that it was the District's position that its right to assign 
teaching assistants to provide the service was not prejudiced by the assignment of 
teachers at the high school to the AIS program. This conversation was memorialized in 
Hall's December 6, 2000 memorandum to Volp, which notes that, based upon his 
informal discussions with the union leadership, there would be no opposition to such an 
arrangement. In February 2001, Norton was notified by the building representatives of 
the two elementary schools that teaching assistants had been acting as AIS teachers 
without teacher supervision. 
It is undisputed that Norton knew in January or February 2000 that teaching 
assistants were assigned to the AIS program in the elementary schools. He testified that 
he assumed, however, that the teaching assistants were functioning under the 
supervision of teachers and not teaching independently. Both elementary school 
principals testified to the same assumption, that the AIS teaching assistants were 
3
 Miller did acknowledge that she worked with LaFemina in preparing a document that 
would set forth the details of the AIS program, but that she had not seen the 
memorandum submitted to Volp by LaFemina. 
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providing the AIS instruction with teacher supervision. LaFemina stated that he had had 
conversations with Miller about AIS students assigned to Iwanczewski. Lacey testified 
that although no one teacher was assigned to supervise Curcuru, she was supervised 
collectively by the teachers of the students who were participating in AIS. 
The Association filed the instant charge on June 1, 2001, alleging that the District 
had unilaterally assigned direct independent instruction of students, which was 
bargaining unit work, to Curcuru and Iwanczewski. The Association had filed a notice of 
claim pursuant to Education Law, §3813, on May 1, 2001. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the ALJ's decision as to timeliness of the improper practice charge and 
timeliness of the notice of claim. The improper practice charge was filed within four 
months of the time that Association was notified that Curcuru and Iwanczewski were 
independently teaching AIS students. That Norton had notice of the hiring of the two 
teaching assistants to provide AIS services is not sufficient to establish that the 
Association had knowledge of their performance of unit work, neither is the fact that 
some unit members may have known before February 2001, that Curcuru and 
Iwanczewski were performing their duties without teacher supervision. The employee 
organization, or its leadership, must have knowledge of the act that constitutes the 
improper practice charge for it to be held to have notice, upon which timeliness 
determinations may be based.4 
As we have found the filing of the charge to be timely, we likewise find the filing 
of the notice of claim to be timely. The notice of claim was filed with the District on May 
J 4
 County of Nassau, 23 PERB1J3051 (1990). 
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1, 2001, within 90 days of when we find that Association had notice of the facts 
underlying the alleged improper practice. A party complies with the notice of claim 
requirements of §3813 of the Education Law when it notifies the school district of its 
claim within 90 days of learning that the school district had unilaterally transferred unit 
work.5 
We turn to the merits ofthe charge and reverse the ALJ's finding that the District 
unilaterally assigned exclusive bargaining unit work to nonunit employees. The record 
does not support a finding that the District assigned teaching duties to Curcuru and 
Iwanczewski that would be performed without teacher supervision. 
We accept for the purposes of our decision the ALJ's definition of unit work as 
teaching independently without supervision of a teacher. It is clear from the record that 
both Curcuru and Iwanczewski have been performing AIS duties independently. The 
question raised by this case is whether their performance of the work without 
supervision by a teacher was pursuant to an assignment by the District. We find that it 
was not. 
Both principals testified that it was their understanding that the teaching 
assistants were to perform the AIS assignment under the supervision of teachers. 
LaFemina confirmed this understanding in his memorandum to the superintendent of 
schools. Indeed, in making her timeliness determination, the ALJ found that both 
elementary school principals thought that the teaching assistants were supervised by 
teachers and that any notice given to the Association would have presumed that the 
teaching assistants who were performing the AIS assignment were properly supervised. 
5
 Because of our findings on the merits ofthe improper practice charge, we do not reach 
the District's other exceptions. 
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The ALJ further found that the Association's unit president, Norton, also thought that the 
teaching assistants were being supervised by teachers. 
However, the ALJ then found that neither Curcuru nor Iwanczewski were told that 
they were to perform the AIS duties under the supervision of a teacher, and that Miller 
was never informed that she was to supervise Iwanczewski. In reaching this 
conclusion, the ALJ makes certain credibility resolutions, finding that the presumptions 
of Lacey and LaFemina do not outweigh the direct testimony of Curcuru, Iwanczewski 
and Miller. We do not agree that a credibility resolution was required here. The record 
reflects that the two principals did not assign unsupervised teaching responsibilities to 
the two teaching assistants. That their understanding of the nature of the assignment 
was not made clear to Curcuru and Iwanczewski, either at the time of their initial 
assignment or subsequently, does not require a credibility resolution to resolve the 
) 
differing positions taken by the parties. The differences between the testimony of the 
Association's witnesses and the District's witnesses evidences a misunderstanding of 
the assignment to the AIS program and does not compel a finding that the District 
specifically, or by acquiescence, assigned unit work to the teaching assistants. 
In fact, Hall's memorandum to the superintendent recommending Iwanczewski 
for appointment contained the proviso that Miller would be supervising her. The 
District's knowledge about the appointment of the teaching assistants to perform AIS 
services stems from that notification, and the presentation of Hall's memorandum at a 
Board of Education meeting. Curcuru and Iwanczewski were hired by the District as 
teaching assistants. As this record does not establish that the District hired the teaching 
assistants to teach the AIS program independently, or that the District was aware that 
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Curcuru and Iwanczewski thereafter provided AIS services without teacher supervision, 
we cannot find that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act.6 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the District's exception to the ALJ's finding that 
the District assigned unit work to nonunit employees, deny or decline to reach the other 
exceptions, and reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
IT ISrTHEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Midaael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Uohn T. Mitchell, Member 
6
 See City of Schenectady, 26 PERB fi 3038 (1993), where we held that an employer is 
not always strictly responsible for the conduct of its supervisors. Even if we were to find 
that LaFemina and Lacey directed Curcuru and Iwanczewski to teach AIS without 
teacher supervision, on this record.we would not find the District liable. See also 
Sherburne-Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist, 36 PERB 1J3011 (February 28, 2003) and Deer 
Park Union Free School Dist, 22 PERB 1J3014 (1989), affg 21 PERB j[4535 (1988) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DIANA L. SIEGEL, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-22972 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
DIANA L. SIEGEL, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL H. JANIS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (MICHELE A. BAPTISE of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Diana L. Siegel (Siegel) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge 
which, as amended, alleged a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) when it denied her 
request to process her grievance to arbitration, did not properly process her internal 
UFT appeal of that denial and renounced its settlement of her appeal. The Board of 
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-v Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) is made a 
statutory party to the proceedings pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Siegel excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the facts do not support the 
ALJ's decision. UFT responded and supports the ALJ's decision. 
^ Based upon our review-of the record and our-consideration of the-partiesL 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts in this case are discussed in detail in the ALJ's decision,1 therefore, the 
Board will only review the facts relevant to Siegel's exceptions. 
Siegel's charge, as amended, alleges that she is a hospital school teacher.2 She 
complained that she was not assigned to teach during the summer at St. Mary's 
) 
Rehabilitation Center, Ossining, New York, in 1997, 1998 and 1999, notwithstanding her 
contractual seniority and retention rights. She contends the position had not been 
posted in accordance with the contract between UFT and the District. 
The record demonstrates that Siegel has been a hospital school teacher for 
twenty-five years. Since 1997, her assignment during the school year has been at PS 
401 in Manhattan and her duties have been performed at Children's Hospital New York 
Presbyterian. She has worked in summer programs for the District since 1996. She 
stated that, because the St. Mary's summer assignment was not posted, she did not 
know about it for three summers. The St. Mary's assignment was only a half hour from 
1
 35 PERB ^4612(2002). 
2
 Hospital school teachers give instruction to severally disabled students, including 
) students who are restricted to hospitals and medical centers for medical reasons. 
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,
 A her house. 
Siegel learned of the St. Mary's position in the Spring of 2000, and immediately 
went to UFT representative, Alfonse Mancuso, for assistance. She wanted to file a 
contract grievance because she believed that UFT would resolve the situation. Siegel 
testified that Mancuso convinced her to forego filing a grievance while they investigated 
her complaint—She received the assignment to St. Mary's for the summer of 2000v 
In her direct testimony, Siegel stated that the principal for the hospital schools, 
Joseph Leonzio, hired the teachers for the summer assignment. Siegel applied for the 
2001 summer assignment at St. Mary's, but she did not receive it. On May 11, 2001, 
she filed a contract grievance. On June 8, 2001, she received a written denial of her 
grievance. She instructed Mancuso to "[p]roceed to step three." As she states in her 
charge, the UFT letter from Howard Solomon dated, July 16, 2001, denying her request 
to proceed to step three "is the smoking gun of my charge," She alleged that it was from 
that point that UFT acted in a manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory and in bad faith. 
In her testimony, Siegel described UFT's conduct in handling her grievance 
which, she believed, supported her charge. In a prior grievance, her appeal request 
had been processed through the Bronx borough office of UFT. The July 16, 2001 letter 
from Solomon, however, informed her to contact Mr. Sprung, Assistant Director of Staff, 
if she wished to appeal UFT's decision not to proceed to step three. 
After unsuccessful attempts to reach Sprung by telephone, as instructed, Siegel 
sent him a letter outlining the grounds for her appeal. She subsequently received a 
telephone call from Gary Rubinowitz who informed her that there was no record of her 
grievance in their computer. Thereafter, she faxed a copy of the July 16, 2001 letter 
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. ^ with other papers to Rubinowitz. Several days later, on September 14, 2001, she 
) 
received a written denial of her appeal request from Vince Gaglione, Bronx borough 
representative of UFT. She was given the names of the UFT officials to contact should 
she wish to process the appeal further. 
On September 21, 2001, Siegel submitted a written request to appeal the 
September-14, 2001 denials She was advised by telephone that her appeal was 
scheduled for October 2, 2001. She attended the appeal with a witness, Gloria Charny. 
At that meeting, Tom Pappa, secretary of UFT, conducted the discussion and, at one 
point, announced to Siegel "[w]hat if we gave you the job at St. Mary's next summer." 
Based on that statement, Siegel considered that she had won her appeal. Pappa told 
her that she would hear from UFT. Siegel received a letter dated October 31, 2001 
denying her appeal. 
On cross-examination, Siegel admitted that her grievance was based upon the 
agreement that UFT and the District made regarding seniority and retention credit prior 
to 2001. Also, that UFT did not take her grievance any further because of this 
agreement. 
With regard to the agreement made between UFT and the District which in effect 
"grand-fathered" teachers for seniority and retention credit in summer assignments for 
the years prior to 2001, Siegel admitted that she did not know what UFT had a right to 
do when negotiating on behalf of its members. She also admitted that the agreement 
protected Ruth Weiss as a member of UFT. 
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Regarding Pappa's statement concerning the St. Mary's assignment, Siegel 
admitted that she did understand that she might not get the assignment. 
UFT's witness, Alphonse Mancuso, testified that, during the Spring or Summer of 
2001, Siegel brought to his attention the method by which Leonzio selected teachers for 
summer assignment, UFT undertook an investigation into the complaint. This issue was 
diseussed-with-the distriet-superintendentrDr. Erber^and they reaehed-the-eonelusion 
that there was a problem with the selection process. An agreement was reached that 
standardized the rules between the schools. As part of that agreement, teachers who 
were in summer assignments prior to 2001 would not be disadvantaged. At the 
insistence of the superintendent, the agreement was not put in writing. 
After Siegel contacted Mancuso regarding the fact that she did not receive the 
Summer 2001 assignment at St. Mary's, he determined that the agreement had been 
followed. Mancuso testified that, during the course of his investigation, he concluded 
that Siegel was not the most senior applicant for the summer assignment at St. Mary's. 
Consequently, it was upon this basis that UFT decided not to pursue her appeal at step 
three. Mancuso acknowledged that this was not an inconsistent position for UFT to take 
because at the lower steps it was the "grievant's right to take a grievance to a step one 
or step two level. Even if it's absurd ... the union has no right to prevent them...." 
However, if they want to proceed to step three then the grievance is presented to the 
borough committee of UFT. They make the determination as to whether the grievance 
has merit and should proceed. 
UFT's other witness, George Fesko, assistant to the president, testified that the 
appeal process is not uniform. Appeals generally go to the borough before they can go 
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-^ before the officers of the union, however, each appeal is handled through Sprung, who, 
) 
at times, will route an appeal directly to the UFT officers. 
DISCUSSION 
Siegel argues in her exceptions that the ALJ committed various factual and legal 
errors in dismissing her charge. In support of these exceptions, she offers additional 
facts which are not partof the record andTthereforermay not be considered by us - -
through her exceptions.3 
The record fails to demonstrate that UFT violated the standard for a duty of fair 
representation charge found in Civil Service Employees Association v. PERB and Diaz.4 
Siegel has, therefore, failed to demonstrate that UFT's conduct, or lack thereof, was 
deliberately invidious, arbitrary or done in bad faith. 
The record is clear that UFT investigated Siegel's complaint over the summer 
assignment in 2000. UFT reached an oral agreement with the District that would affect 
all the units' teachers prior to the summer assignments for 2001. Despite Siegel's 
contention in her exceptions, there is no duty to reduce settlement agreements to 
writing under §204.3 of the Act.5 That Siegel did not like the terms of the agreement 
reached with the District over seniority and retention rights to summer employment 
assignments is evident by her testimony. However, the terms by which the parties elect 
3
 Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB 1J7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB H7005 (1988). 
4
 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 
796, 21 PERB 117017 (1988). 
5
 Local 1170, Communication Workers of America, 23 PERB 1J3004 (1990). Glens Falls 
Police Benev. Ass'n v. PERB, 195 AD2d 933, 26 PERB fl7009 (3d Dep't 1993), conf'g 
) 25 PERB 1J3011 (1992). 
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to settle their differences in this case does not rise to the level of a violation. We have 
previously held that a union is free to waive the rights of one member in preference for 
those of other members, as long as the agreement is not arbitrary, discriminatory or 
made in bad faith.6 
Siegel also takes exception to the manner in which UFT handled her grievance. 
On thisissue, the record demonstrates that, regardless ofthemeritof Siegel's 
grievance, UFT pursued it through step two of the process. At this stage of the process, 
UFT was not required to agree with Siegel's interpretation of the contract, although UFT 
was under an obligation to respond to her concern or request to file a grievance, which 
it did.7 It was at step three that UFT reserved the right to refuse to proceed to 
arbitration. We have consistently held that we would not substitute our judgment for 
that of a union's regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances, for a union is given a 
wide range of reasonableness in these regards. 
UFT's witnesses' explanation of the grievance process at step three was 
unrefuted. Siegel was provided with its reason for denying her request to pursue the 
grievance.8 We find, as did the ALJ, that UFT did not act in an arbitrary, discriminatory 
or bad faith manner in the consideration of the merits of Siegel's grievance or in the 
manner in which it was processed. 
6
 AFSCME, Council 66, Local 930, 25 PERB lf3070 (1992). 
7
 See Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 500 and Central New York Reg'l Transp. 
Auth.,32 PERB 1J3053 (1999 ); United Fed'n of Teachers (Grassel), 33 PERB P062 
(1990). 
See District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1(3062 (1995). 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny Siegel's exceptions and we affirm the decision 
of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
MiaffitaelR. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 100, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23093 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, P.C. (ARTHUR Z. SCHWARTZ of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (VICTOR LEVY and DANIEL 
TOPPER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit Authority 
(NYCTA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the NYCTA 
violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
allegedly threatened to terminate the employment of an employee who had been 
subpoenaed by the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100 (TWU) to testify in 
a disciplinary arbitration on behalf of a TWU member. 
EXCEPTIONS 
NYCTA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred on the law and the facts. The 
TWU filed no response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the arguments 
offered by the NYCTA, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
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FACTS 
The facts, as determined by the ALJ, are set forth in her decision.1 We will recite 
the facts here that are relevant to the exceptions. 
The TWU is the certified bargaining representative of certain non-supervisory, 
operational, maintenance, technical, administrative and clerical employees of the 
NYCTA. The charge, as amended, alleged, inter alia, that on or about November 27, 
2001, a hearing had been scheduled to contest the penalty of dismissal given to Track 
Inspector John Mahon. Prior to the hearing, TWU served a subpoena on Maintenance 
Supervisor II Andre Morgan. The November hearing was adjourned. On or about 
December 13, 2001, General Superintendent of Track, Franz Theodore and 
Superintendent R. Sergio allegedly threatened Supervisor Morgan with termination for 
complying with the subpoena.2 
The TWU's first witness, John Samuelson, testified that at the time of the Mahon 
grievance, he was in the employ of the TWU as the Chairman of the Track Division, 
which is an elected office. In that capacity, he was responsible for the administration of 
the contract between the TWU and NYCTA. He was involved in the contract and 
disciplinary grievance process. With regard to disciplinary grievances, he was involved 
in the defense of members against whom disciplinary charges had been filed. 
NYCTA dismissed Mahon in October 2001 because it alleged that Mahon left a 
dangerous condition on the track unrepaired. TWU initiated a disciplinary grievance 
arbitration to appeal the dismissal that was scheduled to be heard on November 27, 
2001. In preparation for the hearing, Samuelson contacted Mahon's supervisor, Andre 
1
 35 PERB 1J4615 (2002). 
2
 ALJ Exhibit 1. 
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Morgan. Samuelson asked Morgan about the alleged condition of the track and Morgan 
informed him that, in his opinion, the condition of the track was not dangerous. As a 
result of this conversation, Samuelson informed Morgan that TWU would be serving him 
with a subpoena to testify on behalf of Mahon. NYCTA, however, adjourned the 
November 2001 hearing to December 27, 2001. On or about December 15, 2001, 
Morgan complained to Samuelson that Sergio threatened his job and that he was 
scared. Morgan did not appear at the hearing. Nevertheless, the TWU and the NYCTA 
entered into a settlement of Mahon's discipline. 
The settlement stipulated that the penalty of dismissal was reduced to a 
reprimand and, at paragraph numbered fifth, the parties agreed that: 
Grievant [Mahon] and the Union jointly and severally hereby 
release the Transit Authority from any and all claims, 
whether at law, in equity or arising by virtue of contract which 
they may have had heretofore in connection with underlying 
dispute(s) in case number(s) 01-2831-0003. 
Samuelson acknowledged that the settlement stipulation was entered into in 
good faith notwithstanding his prior conversation with Morgan. It was for that reason 
that he took no steps to overturn the settlement. 
Morgan, the TWU's second and final witness, testified that he had been 
employed by the NYCTA since August 1, 1983. At the time of Mahon's discipline In 
October 2001, Morgan was no longer supervising Mahon's work, having been 
transferred to Queensboro in February 2001. He acknowledged that, because of his 
transfer, he did not know the condition of the track at the time Mahon was disciplined. 
Morgan testified that he spoke with both Sergio and Theodore prior to Mahon's hearing. 
They told him to watch what he said. 
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Franz Theodore, General Superintendent of Track, testified for the NYCTA. He 
stated that, as the result of his inspection on October 29, 2001, Mahon received 
discipline. Mahon had been warned about loose bolts on the track resulting from an 
earlier inspection in July 2001. 
Theodore was unaware of Mahon's hearing. He learned about it through Morgan 
who came to see him about one week later to complain about Sergio. Morgan 
complained that Sergio would not let him work overtime and, as a result, he attended 
the November 2001 hearing on his day off. Theodore's response was "you didn't have 
to go if you didn't want to." Theodore explained to Morgan that Sergio had to change 
schedules because another supervisor was on vacation. As a result, Morgan had a 
scheduled day off on December 27, 2001. Morgan never complained about any threat 
from Sergio regarding the hearing, only that he was having a difficult time dealing with 
Sergio's style of work. Theodore stated that he never threatened Morgan. 
Ron Sergio was the NYCTA's last witness. He has been employed by the 
NYCTA for over 24 years. For the past eight years, he has been employed as 
Superintendent of Track Maintenance. Morgan was under his supervision from 
February 2001 to mid-November 2001. In his opinion, Morgan's work performance 
needed improvement. 
Sergio informed Morgan on November 20, 2001 that another supervisor would be 
on vacation and Morgan's regular days off would have to be changed. Morgan was 
concerned that he would lose his premium pay. There was no conversation about the 
Mahon hearing. 
On November 24, 2001, Sergio sent counseling memos to Morgan; his fellow 
supervisor, Nathan Streeder; Track Inspector G. Gaske; and Track Inspector D. 
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Goellner, because of conditions on the track that were in need of immediate repair. 
Sergio indicated in the counseling memo that their failure to take corrective action would 
result in further disciplinary action. 
On December 5, 2001, Morgan was issued a written warning for improperly 
completing the repair work as well as Gaske and Goellner. Morgan, however, refused 
to acknowledge receipt of the warning in writing. Morgan was given until December 18, 
2001 to complete this task. On December 18, 2001, he reported to work without the 
document signed. 
DISCUSSION 
Before the ALJ decided the merits of the improper practice charge, she disposed 
of certain defenses set forth in the NYCTA's answer. Specifically, she dismissed the 
defense of waiver, which the NYCTA argued in its exception was error. 
The ALJ found that the settlement stipulation in the Mahon grievance was 
different from the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the waiver defense. The 
ALJ concluded that it was not apparent that the TWU knew that it was relinquishing its 
right to bring the instant charge when Samuelson executed the settlement stipulation. 
We disagree. 
It cannot be argued, as the ALJ opined, "the connection of this case with the 
underlying Mahon dispute is tangential at best." But for the Mahon grievance, this 
charge would not have a factual basis. The ALJ assumed that Samuelson did not 
understand the consequences of his actions by executing the settlement stipulation. 
The record does not support this assumption. 
Samuelson was the elected representative of the TWU serving in the capacity of 
the Chairman of the Track Division. He had been in that title since January 1, 2000. 
Board - U-23093 - 6 
Prior to that time, he served as Vice Chairman of the Track Division since 1997. Prior to 
that time, he served as an elected shop steward. In his capacity as Chairman of the 
Track Division, he was responsible for the administration of grievances.3 With respect 
to disciplinary grievances, Samuelson represented members through the entire step 
process along with a lawyer.4 The settlement stipulation is signed by Mahon, on his 
own behalf, Samuelson, and a third party, on behalf of TWU. 
The ALJ cites to City of Newburgh5 for support of her conclusion that the TWU 
lacked the requisite knowledge in order to find a waiver. The facts and circumstances 
of Newburgh are distinguishable from the instant charge. In Newburgh, the issue 
involved was whether the parties had waived our statutory jurisdiction in their 
contractual language providing for grievance arbitration. As we held in Newburgh, our 
statute constrains our interpretation of contract language except to the extent that it 
forms the basis of an improper practice charge.6 
We have determined, and the ALJ acknowledged, that language such as that 
found in the Mahon settlement stipulation waives a party's right to prosecute an 
improper practice before PERB.7 The stipulation expressly stated that the grievant 
and the union jointly and severally released the Transit Authority. There is a 
presumption that the parties to a contract intend to bind not only themselves but also 
their personal representatives, unless the contract calls for some personal quality or its 
3
 Transcript, pp. 21-22. 
"Id. 
5
 30 PERB 1J3027 (1997). 
6
 Act, §205.5(d). 
7
 New York City Transit Auth. (Frederickson), 34 PERB ^3006 (2001). 
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words plainly preclude such a presumption.8 Here, the language of the stipulation fails 
to rebut the presumption. The testimony of Samuelson further supports the knowing 
waiver of TWU's rights because the stipulation resulted from good faith negotiations 
even though Morgan had previously advised Samuelson that Sergio had threatened his 
employment. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the NYCTA's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
:U*J(L[ "^\_^i-^<-^L^z.—=-
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
Minevitch v. Puleo, 9 AD2d 285 (1s t Dep't 1959). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DOUGLAS DIETZ, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23271 
UTICA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
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- and -
UTICA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
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COHEN AND COHEN (DANIEL S. COHEN of counsel), for 
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FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. 
(HENRY F. SOBOTA and CRAIG ATLAS of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Douglas Dietz to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing Dietz's improper practice charge filed 
against the Utica Teachers Association (Association) alleging, inter alia, that the 
Association violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it failed to consult with him over the terms of a disciplinary settlement, thereby 
allowing certain counseling memoranda to be placed in his personnel file without his 
knowledge. 
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The Utica City School District (District) is made a statutory party pursuant to 
§209-a.3oftheAct. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Dietz excepts to the ALJ's decision on both legal and factual grounds. The 
Association and the District support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision.1 We will, 
therefore, confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
exceptions. 
Between October 25, 2000 and May 2, 2001, Dietz received several memoranda 
criticizing his job performance. Dietz is a tenured special education teacher and he 
received these memoranda from Karen Kunkel, the principal at the school in which he 
worked. Dietz did not file any grievances over the contents of these memoranda or 
Kunkel's remedial directives. 
In May 2001, however, Dietz contacted the Association's president, Al Martorella, 
to discuss these problems. Martorella referred Dietz to the Association's vice-president 
and grievance chairperson, Nancy Murphy. Although the subject of filing a grievance 
came up in Dietz's discussion with Murphy, there is no record evidence that Dietz asked 
Murphy to file a grievance on his behalf. 
Subsequently, Dietz met with William Morgan, labor relations specialist for the 
Association's parent organization, New York State United Teachers (NYSUT). Morgan 
1
 36 PERB H4504 (2003). 
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instructed Dietz to obtain and review copies of the memoranda that had been placed in 
his personnel file. 
Dietz then met with Morgan and the newly-elected president of the Association, 
Laurence Custodero, in August 2001. They discussed the memoranda as well as 
Dietz's concern over what he considered to be the illegal main-streaming of Special 
Education students assigned to Dietz. During this discussion, they agreed that some of 
the memoranda were too old to challenge. Morgan indicated that he would try to 
persuade the District to remove the memoranda or, alternatively, to modify them into 
counseling memoranda. Again, Dietz did not request that the Association file a 
grievance on his behalf. The District later agreed to modify the memoranda. 
In mid-October, Custodero communicated with the District's Personnel Director, 
James Salamy, regarding the modified memoranda. Salamy faxed copies to Custodero 
who was satisfied that the memoranda had been revised. The District placed the 
revised counseling memoranda into Dietz's personnel file without any further notification 
to either Dietz or the Association. 
In November 2001, Morgan received a letter from Dietz's attorney, D. Victor 
Pellegrino, inquiring into the situation. Morgan responded and directed Pellegrino to 
Custodero, who, in turn, responded to Dietz on December 5, 2001. The letter from 
Custodero explained the steps the Association had taken to have the reprimand letters 
reduced to counseling memoranda. By letter dated January 10, 2002, Dietz informed 
the Association of his objections to the manner in which the Association handled the 
matter and advised the Association that he would consult with counsel.2 
2
 See ALJ Exhibit 1, attachment #8. 
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On April 3, 2002, Dietz filed his original improper practice charge. An amended 
charge was thereafter filed on April 17, 2002. At the conclusion of the hearing, held on 
October 18, 2002, the Association moved to dismiss the charge for failing to state a 
claim of breach of duty of fair representation and for failing to exhaust the grievance 
procedure. The ALJ denied the motion and the Association presented its case. 
DISCUSSION 
To establish a violation of the duty of fair representation under the Act, Dietz 
must demonstrate that the Association's actions toward him were arbitrary, 
discriminatory or taken in bad faith.3 As the ALJ found, Dietz has failed to meet his 
burden of proof. We agree 
Dietz's charge is premised on the fact that the Association acted arbitrarily by 
settling his dispute with the District without investigating the allegations made against 
him and, thereafter, failing to consult with him. Such an action does not violate the Act 
because we have held that a union may settle a grievance without an employee's 
participation as long as it is not done in a manner that violates the Act.4 
Since he offered no evidence to demonstrate that the Association's action was 
either discriminatory or done in bad faith, we must determine whether the Association's 
action was arbitrary. In assessing whether the Association's action was arbitrary, we 
are guided by certain principles. In the absence of proof of improper motive or of 
grossly negligent or irresponsible conduct or of proof of unlawful intent,5 a union does 
3
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1(7024 (3d Dep't 
1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1(7017 (1988). 
4
 AFSCME, Counsel 66 and Local 2055 and Capital Dist. Off-Track Betting Corp. 
(Gregory), 26 PERB 1(3036 (1993). 
5
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n (Kandel), 13 PERB K3049 (1980); Nassau Educ. 
Chapter of the Syoset CSD Unit, CSEA, Inc., 11 PERB 1(3010 (1978). 
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not breach its duty of fair representation merely because it settled the grievance short of 
arbitration.6 Thus, an employee's dissatisfaction with the disposition of a grievance is 
not enough.7 The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be 
expected.8 
Here we find that Dietz received several memoranda over a period of about 
seven months which have been characterized as critical of his performance and 
disciplinary in nature. He took no steps to complain until May 2001. At that time, he 
contacted the Association for assistance. By August 2001, Dietz and Custodero met 
with Morgan who noted that Dietz had waited beyond the contractual forty calendar 
days in order to file a grievance for some of the memoranda. As an alternative, Morgan 
discussed with Dietz and Custodero a plan to persuade the District to either remove the 
memoranda or modify them to counseling memoranda. Dietz did not object to Morgan's 
proposal and the District agreed to modify the memoranda. 
As far as the Association was concerned, the dispute had been resolved except 
that Dietz had not been notified. The record indicates that Custodero had overlooked 
contacting either the District or Dietz concerning the final resolution. Dietz, in turn, 
failed to communicate with the Association or the District. Instead, Dietz consulted with 
an attorney in November 2001 who wrote to Morgan inquiring about the situation. 
Custodero responded to Dietz, by letter dated December 5, 2001, and informed him of 
the action the Association had taken and that the disciplinary letters had been reduced 
6
 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US 171, 64 LRRM 2377 (1967). 
7
 State of New York (SUNYat Buffalo) and United University Professions (Yoonessi), 29 
PERB fl3075 (1996); State of New York and Public Employment Federation, AFL-CIO 
(Robinson, etal.), 14 PERB fl3043 (1981). 
8
 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 US 330, 31 LRRM 2548 (1953). 
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to counseling memoranda. Assuming, arguendo, that Custodero's actions could be 
characterized as negligent, we would not find a violation. We have held that allegations 
that a union has been careless, inept, ineffective or negligent in the investigation and 
presentation of a grievance do not evidence a breach of the union's duty of fair 
representation.9 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Dietz's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge, as amended, must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
9
 District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB TJ3062 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
IUOE LOCAL 545, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF LYSANDER, 
Employer 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
") 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the IUOE Local 545, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
CASE NO. C-5229 
Certification - C-5229 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and regular part-time employees of the Town filling the 
following positions (Civil Service titles): Deputy Town Clerk, 
Assessment Clerk, Data Collector, Receiver of Taxes, Deputy 
Receiver of Taxes, Clerk to Town Justice, Recreation Attendant, 
and Clerk I. 
Excluded: A!I other employees>, inclu_djng seasonal ejriploye_e_s_and the 
confidential secretary to the Town Supervisor. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the IUOE Local 545, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
_ Petitioner, - --
-and- CASE NO. C-5265 
TOWN OF OHIO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5265 - 2 -
Included: Highway Department medium equipment operators. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent, Highway Department 
secretary/bookkeeper and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
IUOE LOCAL 463, 463A, B, C & D, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5275 
TOWN OF CAMBRIA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the IUOE Local 463, 463 A, B, C & D has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5275 - 2 -
Included: Employees of the Town of Cambria's Highway, Sewer and Water 
Departments in the following titles: Motor Equipment Operator, 
Motor Equipment Operator/Foreman, Mechanic, Water 
Maintenance Person and Sewer Maintenance Person. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the IUOE Local 463, 463 A, B, C & D. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 4, 2003 
Albany, New York 
